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Before cities and markets: the political economy of survival in the Paleolithic

Comparative archaeological investigation of production, energy, cooperation, food risk, material exchange, social organization and power before farming, from earliest lithic technologies to Late Pleistocene foragers.
Context
Diverse Pleistocene foraging systems organize production, risk management, material access and social cooperation without presupposing states or monetary markets.
Key risk
Treating first archaeological appearances as dates of universal invention, or projecting modern states, prices, gender roles and class structures onto fragmentary evidence.
Key indicators
New dates and stratigraphic revisions for Lomekwi, Nyayanga and Olorgesailie · Archaeological arguments about fire manufacture versus controlled use · Alternative readings of Sunghir burials and inequality proxies · Further palaeoclimate and material sourcing evidence · Limits of ethnographic analogy across time
EXPLORE RESEARCH

Humans did not begin to solve economic problems when they began to farm, write accounts or mint currency. Long before the first states, hominin communities had to procure food, transform materials, sustain dependent members, organize movement through uncertain environments and maintain relations with other groups. Each solution required the allocation of time, effort, knowledge and risk. Archaeology cannot recover a Paleolithic “gross domestic product”; it can, however, identify technologies, resource use, mobility, exchange, cooperation and some of the constraints that shaped collective life. [1][2][3]

The long prehistory of human economies is neither a history of universal equality nor a prelude in which all societies were waiting to become agricultural. Its most consequential institutions were frequently embedded in households, relationships, customary claims and repeated cooperation rather than permanent offices. The record also documents formidable diversity: different hominin species, very different landscapes, changing climatic regimes and social arrangements that did not all converge toward the same outcome. A stone flake records a productive capability; it does not reveal who owned the quarry, whether the maker led the group or how food was divided. Economic and political history begins by respecting that distinction.

1. The first economy was a problem of uncertainty, not a primitive market

The basic constraint was not the absence of money. It was the unstable relationship between needs and accessible resources. A forager can have abundant food in one season and poor prospects in another; a source of edible plants may be dependable while the capture of a large animal is rare and unpredictable. Movement between habitats, diversified diets, stored knowledge and social ties all create options against failure. Such options can be economically valuable even when no price, wage, market clearing mechanism or record of ownership exists. The relevant variables are caloric yield, preparation and travel costs, seasonality, perishability, danger, dependency and the ability to call on others when one's own search fails.

This is not to imagine an isolated calculating individual. Children, injured people and older adults can depend on access to other people's production; successful resource gathering may require collective effort and shared practical knowledge. A group may prefer reliable food to a higher but volatile average return. A difficult hunting expedition can be justified by social obligations, access to fat, equipment materials or opportunities to sustain relationships rather than by calories alone. Human behavioral ecology provides useful hypotheses about trade-offs; it does not supply direct measurements of the decisions taken by unidentified Paleolithic individuals. Studies of communal hunting and food sharing clarify possible mechanisms while warning against converting present-day cases into exact prehistoric descriptions. [8][17]

To call this an economy is to recognize production, allocation and scarcity. To call it a market economy, a communist commune or a hereditary monarchy would require evidence the earliest sites cannot provide.

2. Stones are evidence of production—not a complete measure of welfare

At Lomekwi 3 in Kenya, artefacts dated to around 3.3 million years ago show deliberate stone breakage and pounding activities. This technological evidence precedes the first widely accepted fossils assigned to the genus Homo and makes it untenable to present stone technology as an invention unique to our species. The identity of the makers is not established merely by an association with hominin fossils in the region. In the Nyayanga deposits of Kenya, Oldowan assemblages and butchered animal remains around 2.9 million years ago provide a different and more directly food-related window into sharp flakes and pounding technologies. The assemblages and dating frameworks are not interchangeable. [1][2]

By around 1.76 million years ago, large cutting tools associated with Acheulean traditions appear in the record. In the Middle Stone Age sequence at Olorgesailie, Kenya, material dated to roughly 320,000–305,000 years ago includes prepared cores, points, pigment processing and nonlocal obsidian. These are archaeological benchmarks for particular places and technologies—not four dates at which a universally shared level of civilization suddenly changed. Preservation, excavation and dating affect when a practice first becomes visible. [3][4]

Research data
Research data
Archaeological contextApproximate antiquityObserved evidenceEconomic interpretation and limitation
Lomekwi 3, Kenya3.3 million yearsLarge flakes, cores and percussionDeliberate material transformation; toolmaker identity and social regime unknown
Nyayanga, KenyaAbout 2.9 million yearsOldowan tools, animal-bone modificationsFood processing and access to animal resources; no evidence of formal markets
Acheulean assemblages across regionsFrom about 1.76 million yearsShaped large cutting toolsRepeated investment in tool manufacture; costs and functions differ by site
Olorgesailie, KenyaAbout 320,000–305,000 yearsPoints, pigments, nonlocal obsidianDiversified technology and material circulation; specific trading terms unknown
Selected archaeological technological benchmarks, not dates of universal inventionmillions of years before present; approximate site-level reported antiquities
Lomekwi 3 stone artefacts
3.3
Nyayanga Oldowan assemblage
2.9
Acheulean large cutting tools
1.76
Olorgesailie Middle Stone Age assemblage
0.32
View data
Selected archaeological technological benchmarks, not dates of universal invention
Indicator / periodValue (millions of years before present; approximate site-level reported antiquities)
Lomekwi 3 stone artefacts3.3
Nyayanga Oldowan assemblage2.9
Acheulean large cutting tools1.76
Olorgesailie Middle Stone Age assemblage0.32

The length of a bar represents geological antiquity, not technical sophistication, human welfare, rate of innovation or the number of people using a technology. Archaeological first appearances are minimum documented ages subject to future discovery. This distinction blocks an appealing but false story in which every new tool type replaces all older techniques everywhere.

3. Tools were productive assets, but not necessarily private capital

Making a flake requires selecting a stone, knowing where and how to strike, carrying material and discarding unsuccessful pieces. A prepared tool can save processing time or give access to food inaccessible with bare hands. The economic logic is therefore an investment of effort in a technology that can yield repeated benefits. But the archaeological existence of durable equipment does not establish a transferable title to the asset, a loan market for implements or the private accumulation of wealth.

The choice of raw material shows a particularly important constraint. At Nyayanga, later research documented procurement of appropriate stones from sources several kilometres away. In other contexts, transported stone may indicate mobility by the toolmaker, movement among residential groups, direct procurement during planned journeys or exchange. The number of kilometres between geological source and excavation is not automatically the distance traversed by a merchant, nor evidence of a market price. [5]

Skill also changes the production frontier. A tool that takes longer to fabricate may pay off where repeated butchery, scraping or woodworking is expected; a simple expedient flake may be preferable when mobility makes heavy equipment costly. Knowledge of stone fracture, wood, hides, plants and local animal behavior becomes a productive capability transmitted through observation and learning. Such transmission can occur without schools, written instructions or professional occupations in the modern sense. Material traces capture only a fraction of that inventory because wood, fibre and other organic objects seldom survive as consistently as stone. [3]

4. Food portfolios: plants, carcasses, hunting and coastal resources

It is misleading to describe Paleolithic sustenance as an exclusive regime of heroic big-game hunting. The spectrum of food opportunities included plant collecting and processing, animal scavenging and hunting, insects, roots, fruits, nuts, aquatic resources and smaller animals; composition changed with geography, period and species. A cut-marked bone does not by itself tell whether the animal was killed by a hominin, obtained from another predator or processed after natural death. Plant residues and pounding wear, where sufficiently diagnosed, can fill a part of the record otherwise dominated by resistant bone and stone. [2][8]

In the North European Last Interglacial, the Neumark-Nord elephant assemblage shows that Neanderthals processed enormous animals around 125,000 years ago and that the activity recurred across many generations. The volume of meat, fat and other material suggests labor demands and possibilities for storage, sharing or temporary aggregation that standard portrayals of tiny isolated groups overlook. Yet the size of one carcass cannot determine the number of households in an ordinary residential group; the archaeologists' interpretation requires contextual assemblages, taphonomy and repeated-site evidence. [7]

Aquatic subsistence demonstrates another arrangement of risk and seasonality. Isotopic analysis of shells from Mesolithic northern Iberia reconstructs shifts in collecting areas, seasonality and estuarine use, showing how changing waters and local geography affected procurement. These later foragers are not a model of every Pleistocene coast. Their record illustrates why the food economy must be reconstructed from the specific ecosystem rather than derived from an imagined universal diet. [13]

5. Cooperation changes the feasible scale of production

An individual can collect some foods alone; capturing and processing large, fast or dangerous animals often rewards coordination. Comparative research on communal drives finds that, in certain environments, people can increase returns or reduce the likelihood of failure by combining roles and synchronizing action. The same coordination creates monitoring and distribution problems: who joins, who supplies equipment, how burdens are shared, what happens when someone is injured and who receives food afterward? These are institutional questions even without a treasury or centralized state. [17]

There are several reasons to distribute food beyond immediate self-consumption. Resource acquisition is uncertain; sharing can redistribute risk over time. Large packages may decay before one household can use them. Supporting dependents contributes to reproductive and social continuity. Gifts can sustain reciprocal relationships; public consumption and generosity can also enhance prestige. None of these mechanisms requires a single universal norm. Nor do mathematical models of the origins of provisioning establish that one precise pattern existed among the makers of the first stone tools. [8]

Transmission chain
  1. Variable local resources
  2. diversified procurement and cooperation
  3. food, materials and knowledge acquired
  4. household consumption and transfers to others
  5. survival support and social relationships
  1. Unpredictable hunting returns
  2. sharing across successful and unsuccessful occasions
  3. potential reduction in individual shortfall risk
  4. demand for reciprocal trust and social enforcement

The arrows describe conditional mechanisms rather than a claim that every prehistoric group practiced equal redistribution. If social obligations were coercively enforced, or if a dominant household controlled access to high-value food, the same production system could generate hierarchy instead of egalitarian risk pooling.

6. Social networks were infrastructure before roads and bureaucracies

A community's economic capacity depends in part on relations extending beyond its camp. Relationships can facilitate marriage, visits, information about routes and water, raw-material access, temporary refuge and food assistance. Genetic analyses of individuals at Sunghir, a roughly 34,000-year-old Upper Paleolithic context in Russia in the study's chronology, indicate limited close kinship within the sampled burial group and support an interpretation of residential communities embedded in wider reproductive networks. This is evidence about the analysed individuals and population structure, not a census of the whole Paleolithic. Dating and burial-context interpretation remain subjects of research. [11]

Ethnographic investigation of 32 contemporary foraging societies found residential bands consisting of both relatives and non-relatives. A separate study of Hadza networks identified connections between cooperative behavior and ties between individuals and camps. Both results challenge a simplistic picture in which prehistoric cooperation must have occurred only among tightly related families. But present-day foragers live in historical circumstances shaped by contact, dispossession, markets and policy. Ethnography can generate testable models; the prehistoric record must independently constrain those models. [9][10]

Networks also expose groups to social risks. Maintaining alliances requires effort; a promise may be broken; a route may become unsafe. Exchange depends on knowledge of others' reliability and may coexist with hostility. Economic organization therefore cannot be inferred from climate and tools alone. It also depends on social relations that can widen access to resources or restrict it.

7. Mobility was sometimes a productive strategy, not evidence of backwardness

Moving a residential group costs time, disrupts access to stored goods and exposes vulnerable members to travel burdens. Remaining in one location can reduce transport costs and allow the repeated use of shelters and local resources, but also intensifies depletion or exposure to localized environmental shocks. The better choice varies seasonally and by landscape. Mobility may involve whole groups, temporary task parties, repeated seasonal circuits or longer relocation. It is not synonymous with constant wandering.

The difference between resource location and settlement location matters. A lithic source far from a camp can be reached during a multi-purpose journey, through exchange, by a mobile specialist group or after several transfers. The Olorgesailie obsidian evidence—chemically linked to sources at least 25–50 kilometres away—demonstrates extensive material movement and is consistent with connections among groups. It does not identify a trader, currency, exclusive territorial entitlement or payment. [4]

Maritime movement complicates a land-only history. Excavations at Madjedbebe in northern Australia have been interpreted as evidence of occupation beginning around 65,000 years ago, with grinding stones, ochre and other material. The dating and the wider dispersal chronology remain debated. Reaching Sahul required movement through changing island and coastal geographies; neither a modern nation-state map nor a hypothetical direct voyage should stand in for the prehistoric palaeogeography. [12]

8. Exchange can precede formal money and still be politically consequential

Exchange is broader than sale. Materials can circulate through gifts, visiting partners, reciprocal obligations, marriage ties, seasonal meetings, acquisition journeys and multi-stage transfer. Recognizing that diversity prevents two errors: assuming every exotic stone proves a price-making market, or assuming that the absence of coinage means economically isolated societies.

The Olorgesailie assemblages combine nonlocal obsidian, technological change and pigments. This combination is compatible with wider communication networks that could have helped communities cope with changing ecosystems. The chemical identification of a nonlocal raw material is stronger evidence than the precise diplomatic or commercial meaning of its transfer. A geochemical sourcing result can narrow origin; it rarely reconstructs the full sequence of possessors or the social status of participants. [4]

A material moving across a landscape can also create a political relationship: permission to access a quarry, obligations to hosts, knowledge shared between groups and the possibility of excluding outsiders. Yet those rights cannot be called a state border or private property without corroborating evidence. In deep prehistory, the economics of circulation is often observable earlier and more clearly than the legal rules under which circulation occurred.

9. Fire changed energy use; invention, maintenance and routine use are different questions

Fire potentially alters the edible range of foods, preparation costs, protection from cold and predators, light after sunset and spaces for social gathering. The crucial distinctions are between a naturally occurring fire, controlled use of an existing flame, routine maintenance and deliberate ignition. Their earliest surviving traces are not necessarily contemporaneous. The presence of heated sediment or burnt bone requires tests that separate human activity from natural burning and later disturbance. [6]

A 2025 study in Nature reported pyrite fragments, heated sediments and fire-altered stone at the approximately 400,000-year-old Barnham site in Britain, interpreting them as the earliest then-established evidence of deliberate fire-making. The authors' claim concerns making fire and must not be confused with much older evidence proposed for the use of fire. In economic terms, maintaining a flame depends on fuel collection and continuity of care; producing fire on demand changes when and where that resource can be deployed. Yet identifying a technological possibility is not measuring every household's fuel budget. [6]

Heating can also produce costs and conflict: collection of wood, smoke exposure, competition over appropriate sites and dependence on shared hearths. A technology may change group routines without causing permanent settlements or hierarchical leadership. Its significance lies in expanded possibilities, which different societies can realize differently.

10. Labor, bodies, skill and the danger of projecting modern roles backward

Reconstructions in which men invariably hunted, women invariably gathered and elders contributed little are more confident than the archaeological record permits. The survival of points or animal bones does not identify the sex of every producer or participant; tools can be made by one person and used by another. Childcare, plant processing, maintenance, transport, hunting and knowledge transfer may shift with local circumstances and life stage. Sarah Lacy and Cara Ocobock's review challenges claims of a universal rigid Paleolithic sexual division of labor, while leaving open variation between groups and periods. [14]

Bodies matter without fixing an entire social order. Pregnancy, nursing, injuries, skill acquisition and age can influence task choices; they do not alone determine legal authority, household control of food or universal prohibitions. A person's productivity cannot be represented only by the calories they bring to camp. Care work, tool instruction, location knowledge and conflict mediation may be economically decisive even where they leave few durable archaeological traces.

Social history cannot consist only of spectacular weapons and elite burials. Animal bones and tool scatters are partial records of labor; preserved plant remains, residues, human health indicators and domestic space can bring less visible work into consideration. The methodological consequence is restraint, not silence: hypotheses about the division of tasks require multiple independent lines of evidence rather than assumptions taken from contemporary stereotypes.

11. Hierarchy, prestige and inequality before agriculture

No defensible universal statement makes every mobile foraging society equal or every large settlement hierarchical. Some contemporary and historically documented foraging societies showed differences in rank, material accumulation and influence, often associated with resource defensibility, demographic pressure or constraints on movement. A 2026 scholarly commentary reviewing archaeological arguments rejects the convention of treating foragers as necessarily egalitarian and emphasizes variation in autonomy and resource access. [16]

Sunghir's striking Upper Paleolithic burials show that costly objects and elaborate mortuary treatment could exist without evidence of an agricultural state. But grave wealth is not automatically the same as lifetime income, political office, hereditary land title or control over food stocks. The distinction between ceremonial expenditure, prestige and enforceable productive ownership is crucial. Even a clear difference in grave goods may reflect ritual selection or burial practices rather than the full distribution of wealth. [11][18]

New quantitative work on archaeological inequality emphasizes selection and preservation biases. Only some people receive archaeologically recognizable graves; different materials survive differently; excavated samples are rarely random; the estimated inequality of one observable object cannot be transparently transformed into a society-wide income Gini coefficient. Approaches that account for uncertainty are useful, but do not manufacture a single series of prehistoric global income inequality. [15]

A stronger causal proposition is conditional: where control of scarce resources can be defended, transmitted and supported by social enforcement, accumulation or hierarchy becomes more feasible. Where people can credibly leave, share access or resist monopolization, authority faces constraints. Neither arrangement is guaranteed by the presence or absence of farming.

12. Prehistoric political economy: authority without necessarily a state

Leadership can be situational. Knowledge of a hunting route, ritual expertise, conflict resolution or the capacity to mobilize allies may confer influence without a formal bureaucracy. Collective decisions can coexist with prestige and coercion; a community can possess enforceable norms without coins, courts or written codes. Archaeology usually reveals outcomes—settlement layouts, differential access to resources, violence, social differentiation—more readily than a constitution.

This asymmetry matters for explanations of the origins of the state. It would be methodologically indefensible to identify the first stone-tool producer as a “chief,” treat every large campsite as a centralized administration or calculate taxes from ordinary communal food distribution. Conversely, absence of a surviving palace or script does not prove the absence of organized leadership. Political categories must be matched to the scale of the evidence.

The reciprocal link between economy and authority nevertheless remains meaningful. People who organize difficult procurement may gain a voice in the distribution; people who control access to dependable resources may acquire bargaining power; households able to leave can limit the demands of would-be leaders. These are mechanisms to test against sites and comparative material, not a reconstructed sequence of governments for the entire Pleistocene.

The earliest-technologies chart compresses millions of years; later activities would be visually nearly invisible on its scale. A closer chronology separates a much later fire-making context from Neanderthal megafauna exploitation, the debated early Australian occupation and the Sunghir graves. These dates are approximate site contexts, not the invention dates of fire, hunting, sea travel or funerary ritual. The sites are independent; plotting them together does not imply an evolutionary succession. [6][7][11][12]

Later prehistoric evidence on a closer time scalethousands of years before present; approximate reported site antiquity
Barnham deliberate fire-making interpretation
400
Neumark-Nord elephant exploitation
125
Madjedbebe early occupation
65
Sunghir Upper Paleolithic context
34
View data
Later prehistoric evidence on a closer time scale
Indicator / periodValue (thousands of years before present; approximate reported site antiquity)
Barnham deliberate fire-making interpretation400
Neumark-Nord elephant exploitation125
Madjedbebe early occupation65
Sunghir Upper Paleolithic context34

13. Geography of evidence: different ecologies, different options

Selected archaeological contexts and what they can establish; this is not a map of modern national origins
West Turkana, Kenya
Lomekwi stone technologies around 3.3 million years ago

Maker identity and institutions unresolved

Lake Victoria region, Kenya
Nyayanga early Oldowan and food processing

Local deposits, not a world-wide consumption survey

Olorgesailie, Kenya
Long-distance stone movement and pigments about 320,000 years ago

Raw-material transport does not establish a monetary market

Neumark-Nord, Germany
Neanderthal exploitation of large elephants about 125,000 years ago

Scale of carcasses does not determine ordinary residential size

Sunghir, Russia
Upper Paleolithic genomic and mortuary evidence

Selected burials cannot stand for all households

Madjedbebe, Australia
Early occupation evidence and diverse tool use

Dispersal dates and routes require regional methodological debate

Cantabria, Spain
Mesolithic shell isotope evidence for variable aquatic procurement

Later regional comparison, not a direct Pleistocene analogue

Research data
Research data
ClaimStrongest observed materialWhat cannot be concluded from that material alone
Tool production existed well before Homo sapiensDated lithic assemblages and manufacture tracesNamed inventors, a single origin of all tool traditions or ownership regime
Food resources were variedCut marks, residue, grinding wear, faunal and plant evidenceUniversal diet proportions, wages or a common prehistoric calorie budget
Some resources circulated over long distancesGeochemical sourcing of nonlocal stoneWhether goods were sold, gifted or directly collected
Social life crossed small family unitsAncient DNA and ethnographic comparisonComplete political structure of Paleolithic populations
Some groups had costly mortuary distinctionsSelected burials and grave objectsGeneralized income inequality or a permanent class state

The juxtaposition of early African toolmaking, Eurasian large-game exploitation, Australian occupation and later European coastal gathering is analytical, not a claim that all cases occurred simultaneously. Different sampling methods and dating standards constrain comparability.

14. Climate, scarcity and technological response: a contested causal chain

Environmental variability can change the economic value of flexibility. When a preferred resource becomes less dependable, groups may expand diets, move, exchange or develop specialized tools. At Olorgesailie, environmental research linked major ecological variability with a shift toward smaller tools, nonlocal materials and pigments. The interpretation is plausible because the material and palaeoenvironmental sequences can be studied together; it remains a hypothesis about causation rather than proof that climate “invented” trade or symbolic behavior. [4]

There are competing explanations. Innovation may arise through demographic contacts and cumulative learning; population movements can spread practices that originated elsewhere; source-material access can shift independently of climatic change; an apparent archaeological gap can result from erosion or incomplete excavation. Rapid change in surviving artefacts could reflect a change of site function rather than a general transformation in society. No single variable accounts for technological and institutional diversity across millions of years.

A defensible test asks what an alternative explanation predicts: if environmental disruption drove diversification, dated changes in habitat and food resources should align with changes in tools and movement, allowing for lags. If a network mechanism dominates, concentrations of distinctive materials and practices may follow contact corridors across different ecological settings. If preservation dominates, additional excavations may erase the claimed technological discontinuity. The available observations support investigation, not a universal adaptive law.

15. What precedes the Neolithic transition—and what does not

The pre-agricultural record already contains deliberate material production, significant investments in skill, resource-processing specialization, social exchange, care, social differentiation and varied ways of coordinating action. Agricultural domestication did not introduce production, politics or inequality into an otherwise economically empty world. It altered the dependence on particular resources, the possibilities for maintaining fixed places and stores, and the conditions under which access to land and labor might be controlled.

The next historical transformation therefore cannot be evaluated solely by asking whether farming yielded more food per hectare. It requires examining nutritional outcomes, disease, work intensity, demographic growth, ecological reliability, the defense of stored surpluses and the potential emergence of more durable institutional claims. Some groups experimented with cultivation without quickly abandoning foraging; others remained mobile long after farming became possible in neighboring regions. The record does not support an inevitable single path from stone tool to field to king to market.

Paleolithic political economy demonstrates a more general result: resources become social capabilities through technology, knowledge, relationships and rules of access. The same equipment may support sharing in one setting and social domination in another. The crucial historical variables are not a supposed rank on a civilizational ladder, but who can organize labor, withstand uncertainty, move, refuse demands and retain the benefits of collective production.

Sources and research notes

[1] Harmand et al., “3.3-million-year-old stone tools from Lomekwi 3,” Nature (2015): https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14464

[2] Smithsonian Institution, “2.9-Million-Year-Old Butchery Site Reopens Case of Who Made First Stone Tools” (2023), reporting Nyayanga research in Science: https://www.si.edu/newsdesk/releases/29-million-year-old-butchery-site-reopens-case-who-made-first-stone-tools

[3] Smithsonian Human Origins Program, “Stone Tools”: https://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/behavior/stone-tools

[4] Brooks et al., “Long-distance stone transport and pigment use in the earliest Middle Stone Age,” Science (2018), abstract and bibliographic record: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29545508/

[5] Smithsonian Institution, Nyayanga raw-material procurement research statement (2025): https://www.si.edu/newsdesk/releases/craft-early-tools-ancient-human-relatives-transported-stones-over-long-distances

[6] Davis et al., “Earliest evidence of making fire,” Nature (2025): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-09855-6

[7] Gaudzinski-Windheuser, Kindler and Roebroeks, “Widespread evidence for elephant exploitation by Last Interglacial Neanderthals,” PNAS (2023): https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2309427120

[8] “The evolution of early hominin food production and sharing,” PNAS (2023), model and discussion: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10288599/

[9] Hill et al., “Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure,” Science (2011): https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21393537/

[10] Apicella et al., “Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers,” Nature (2012): https://www.nature.com/articles/nature10736

[11] Sikora et al., “Ancient genomes show social and reproductive behavior of early Upper Paleolithic foragers,” Science (2017): https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28982795/

[12] Clarkson et al., “Human occupation of northern Australia by 65,000 years ago,” Nature (2017): https://www.nature.com/articles/nature22968

[13] Milano et al., “Temporal and spatial variability of prehistoric aquatic resource procurement,” Scientific Reports (2022): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-07239-8

[14] Lacy and Ocobock, “Woman the hunter: The archaeological evidence,” American Anthropologist (2024): https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13914

[15] Fochesato and Bowles, “Accounting for uncertainty and bias in archaeological and historical evidence on wealth inequality,” PNAS (2026): https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2514309123

[16] Kohler, “Archaeology supports proposed redefinition of egalitarianism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2026), abstract: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/42825715/

[17] Morin et al., “Why Do Humans Hunt Cooperatively?” Current Anthropology (2024): https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/732354

[18] Trinkaus et al., “Diversity and differential disposal of the dead at Sunghir,” Antiquity (2018): https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2017.223

Authorship

Christian Rafael de Souza Silva

Author · Researcher · Marginal Thinking · LOGV Research

christian@marginalthinking.org
How to cite

Silva, Christian Rafael de Souza. “Before cities and markets: the political economy of survival in the Paleolithic.” Marginal Thinking / LOGV Research, 2026-11-02.

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