The West and the Politics of Fear: Civil Preparedness, Psychological Warfare and Narratives of Collapse

1. What actually happened from 2024 to November 2026

European recommendations did not begin in the past few weeks. In 2024, former Finnish president Sauli Niinistö delivered a review of civilian and military preparedness to the European Commission. Among its proposals was a minimum target of 72 hours of household self-sufficiency. On 26 March 2025, the Commission presented the Preparedness Union Strategy, designed for threats of military, health, climatic, technological and logistical origin. In July 2025, it proposed an EU-wide stockpiling strategy and a medical countermeasures strategy. [4][5][6]

The United Kingdom launched its Be Ready campaign on 22 October 2026, with a planned three-year duration. The government communication explicitly refers to storms, wildfires, floods, cyber incidents and temporary losses of water, power, phone connectivity or internet service. It asks households to check existing supplies first and acquire additional items gradually. Its stated purpose is to withstand roughly three days of disruption, not to announce that the population will be abandoned during a scheduled war. [1][7]

Germany recommends building progressively toward ten days of self-sufficiency, while acknowledging that even three days of reserves can help. Its federal civil protection agency addresses ordinary and extraordinary hazards. Sweden's 2024 booklet In Case of Crisis or War explicitly includes the possibility of war but also addresses drinking water, hygiene, food, communications and neighborhood assistance. Different national time horizons undermine the idea that “72 hours” constitutes a universal countdown. [8][9]

NATO's document of 15 September 2026 sets requirements for continuity of government, energy, movement of people, food and water, health care, communications and transport. It concerns Allied states' capacity to absorb shocks and support collective operations. It is institutional contingency planning, not a public forecast of a military offensive on a specified date. [2]

In Brazil, the national civil defense secretariat had already issued equivalent household advice in March and April. A formal statement dated 7 November 2026 emphasized that these were standing preventive guidelines, not an extraordinary national alert or a prediction of widespread shortages. As an additional chronological control, Mato Grosso do Sul's civil defense service published emergency-kit, medication and family-plan advice in January 2026. Brazilian references to emergency kits cannot be explained solely by Europe's military situation. [3][10]

The sequence reveals a gradual reorganization of resilience policy, intensified by accumulated crises and a deteriorating security environment. The official documents examined through 8 November 2026 do not establish a new European Commission directive dated 3 November as the start of the 72-hour recommendation. Its verifiable institutional starting point is March 2025. Misdated warnings can create an artificial impression of sudden acceleration.

2. Civil defense returns to security strategy

The modern separation between battlefield and economic rear area has always been incomplete. Armed forces depend on the same electricity grids, roads, telecommunications providers, refineries, ports, industrial suppliers and hospitals used by civilian populations. An interruption in fuel transportation restricts commerce and can also limit military mobilization. Disruption to an electricity distribution network can simultaneously impair drinking-water treatment, food refrigeration, connectivity and hospital capacity. [2][11]

During the Cold War, civil defense occupied a recognized place in European security planning. The United Kingdom issued the Protect and Survive booklet in 1980, describing precautions against nuclear war. The end of bipolar confrontation, the globalization of production and the emphasis on overseas military operations weakened elements of territorial civilian preparedness. NATO renewed its resilience emphasis after 2014 and formalized seven baseline requirements at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. [11][12]

The pandemic exposed constraints in medical equipment, hospital capacity and supply chains. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the human and economic costs of prolonged attacks against energy networks and civilian systems. Floods, droughts and extreme weather reinforced the need for local capabilities independent of armed conflict. Together these experiences increased the political and operational value of reducing absolute dependence on daily deliveries. [4][5]

The reappearance of household manuals is therefore not an isolated discontinuity in 2026. It belongs to a broader doctrinal change: anticipate and absorb interruptions, maintain essential functions and restore critical services before a limited shock becomes a national crisis. Preparedness can protect civilians and strengthen military deterrence at the same time. That dual civilian-military purpose requires public scrutiny; it does not establish that the civilian purpose is fictitious.

3. The economics of emergency supplies: 72 hours is not a prophecy

A household reserve has three straightforward economic effects. First, it reduces dependence on purchases and travel during the opening hours of an emergency. Second, it can smooth last-minute demand when distribution is temporarily impaired. Third, it provides time for governments, operators and volunteers to restore services and prioritize people who cannot maintain their own reserves. It does not eliminate the need for public infrastructure; it buys time for that infrastructure to operate.

The recommended duration depends on climate, territory, population density, evacuation options, historical disruptions and state capacity. The United Kingdom uses three days; Germany recommends up to ten; Sweden asks households to adapt plans to their individual needs. These are not measurements of the expected length of a future war. [7][8][9]

Identical quantities can also mean different things. The British checklist specifies three liters of drinking water per person per day while noting that cooking and hygiene require additional water. Germany's household guidance provides a two-liter daily reference for drinking and food preparation. Neither number measures the imminence of disaster, and comparing them requires attention to included uses, climate and household composition. [7][8]

An unplanned rush to supermarkets can create precisely the short-lived distribution pressure that gradual stockbuilding is designed to avoid. Everyday goods are replenished on scheduled delivery cycles constrained by shelf space, transport and staffing. Sudden demand can outpace restocking even when national production has not fallen. Claims of shortage must therefore be tested against deliveries and inventories, not decontextualized videos of empty shelves.

4. Material vulnerability exists before the headline

Advanced economies became highly efficient by reducing inventory costs, integrating suppliers and coordinating production with delivery. The same efficiency created dependencies that consumers seldom see. Water utilities need power, treatment chemicals, pumps and specialized staff. Electricity networks depend on fuel, transformers and communications. Food markets require refrigerated transport, payment systems, packaging, warehouses and confidence that deliveries will continue.

Physical and digital disruptions produce different consequences. A local power outage may be repaired without enduring production losses. Damage to difficult-to-replace equipment can extend downtime. A cyberattack against logistics can disrupt operations without destroying facilities. A false rumor about imminent supermarket closures may trigger concentrated purchases without any preceding technical failure. The appropriate response depends on which link has actually failed. [2][11]

The first chain traces an operational shock; the second depicts a possible feedback loop in panic buying. Either can occur without the other. Their separation prevents analysts from attributing verified technical damage to propaganda or assigning shortages caused by unusual demand to a foreign adversary without evidence.

5. What psychological warfare is — and what it is not

“Psychological warfare” is a broad expression often covering influence operations, propaganda, threats, intimidation, disinformation and perception management. Analytical use requires distinctions among content, intent, coordination, attribution and results. An alarmist headline can be inaccurate without being a military operation. A valid government warning can be repurposed by third parties. A coordinated network impersonating a reputable newspaper behaves differently from frightened individuals spontaneously sharing a report.

NATO defines hostile information threats in terms of intentional, harmful, manipulative and coordinated activities by state or non-state actors that adversely affect the information environment. The European External Action Service uses the category foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), emphasizing behavioral patterns and supporting infrastructure. These are more demanding criteria than treating every pessimistic message as a psychological weapon. [13][14]

Information warfare seeks to alter decisions and political costs. Discrediting a source can make citizens disregard genuine warnings. Repeating threats can increase their prominence. Circulating many mutually inconsistent explanations can create fatigue and a reluctance to verify. Influence does not require converting every recipient to one ideology. In certain situations, degrading a population's ability to recognize shared evidence, plan and coordinate may be enough.

Yet fear-based content has no single presumed origin. Government campaigns, commercial publishers, journalistic errors, satire, domestic political disputes and genuine concern coexist. Attribution requires evidence such as common infrastructure, coordinated accounts, financing, technical records, synchronized behavior and independent investigation. The similarity of subject matter is not sufficient.

6. What European investigations actually found

The European External Action Service's fourth annual threat report, released in March 2026, examined 540 detected FIMI incidents in 2025. Of this investigated sample, 29% were attributed to Russia and 6% were linked to China; approximately 65% were left without conclusive attribution. The report also recorded 10,500 unique channels involved in the investigated incidents. These figures describe the service's selected and analyzed observations, not all false messages on the internet or the share of Europeans persuaded by them. [14]

It would be incorrect to interpret the remaining 65% as incidents from a single unnamed country or to assume that all cases achieved comparable reach. Some operations are related, while others resist attribution because networks hide accounts, servers and financing. Channel counts and incident counts measure distinct objects. [14]

In October 2026, the Council of the European Union extended restrictive measures concerning hybrid activities attributed to Russia until October 2027. Its statement reported 80 individuals and 20 entities under this sanctions framework at the time. In March, the Council had condemned sabotage, electoral interference, foreign information manipulation and malicious cyber operations. These are identifiable institutional actions and government attributions, not independent forensic examinations of every supermarket-related headline. [15][16]

The operation known as Doppelganger, investigated by EU DisinfoLab since 2022, used websites impersonating legitimate media and public institutions as well as cross-platform distribution networks. The investigators caution that available evidence does not establish a single centralized controller for every related information activity. The existence of documented campaigns makes hostile exploitation of survival and shortage narratives plausible; it does not prove that any particular emergency-kit message originated with those networks. [17]

7. The infrastructure of fear: journalism, platforms and repetition

A technical warning normally contains conditions: a given region may experience disruption under certain scenarios, and maintaining supplies reduces harm. As the message circulates, its conditions, scale and time horizon may disappear. “Prepare for three days” becomes “the government expects chaos in three days.” The second formulation is more emotional and easier to share, but far less faithful to the primary document.

These incentives do not require a conspiracy. Digital publishers compete for attention and revenue. Short videos need immediately recognizable imagery. Partisan accounts often select items consistent with existing expectations. Recommendation systems can repeatedly display similar headlines following earlier engagement, creating a subjective impression that every country is issuing the same warning simultaneously. This is a plausible mechanism, not a quantified finding about the particular news wave of November 2026.

The social amplification of risk framework, developed by Roger Kasperson and colleagues in 1988 and revisited in subsequent research, explains how risk signals are filtered by media, institutions, social groups and interpersonal networks. Behavioral responses can produce secondary economic and political impacts even where the original physical danger has not grown proportionately. The framework also recognizes risk attenuation: important threats can be ignored. [18][19]

The World Health Organization used the term infodemic for information overload involving both accurate and inaccurate messages during health emergencies. A pandemic is not equivalent to a military conflict, but the informational mechanism is relevant: saturation can make practical guidance difficult to identify, increase anxiety and weaken trust in authorities. [20]

Each step identifies a possible causal mechanism, not an automatic attribution. The same circuit can be activated by an operational failure, a marketing campaign, a hostile influence effort or repeated circulation of entirely legitimate guidance.

8. Why survival messages carry unusual psychological force

Food, water, shelter and the protection of dependents belong to a sphere in which uncertainty is difficult to tolerate. The threat is perceived not only as a possible income loss but as an immediate inability to care for other people. Such messages need little technical explanation to provoke concern. An empty faucet and a bare food shelf are instantly legible across languages.

Risk psychology has long examined how perceived control, irreversibility, unpredictability and involuntary exposure shape judgments. This does not mean the public is incapable of evaluating risk. It means technical and emotional messages activate different concerns. Public communication must convert imperfect evidence into useful decisions without concealing uncertainty or shifting the full burden of resilience onto individuals. [18][19]

Repetition has ambiguous effects. Repeated preparedness instructions can help people remember sensible procedures. Repeated collapse headlines without new evidence can make a scenario feel familiar and lead readers to confuse publication frequency with event probability. Responsible warnings distinguish communication frequency, likelihood of an event, severity of harm and time horizon.

Fear can also have political value for different actors. A government may invoke resilience to justify public investment; an opposition may present warnings as evidence of administrative failure; a foreign adversary may cast defensive expenditure as a sign of Western decline; businesses may advertise supplies. Incentives alone are not proof of manipulation. A defensible attribution requires documented actions and a traceable evidentiary chain.

9. The political economy of preparedness

Resilience changes the conversation about economic efficiency. Redundancy is expensive: reserve inventories occupy space and capital; backup generators require maintenance; parallel infrastructure raises expenditure; drills consume staff time. But insufficient redundancy can multiply losses during a disruption, especially when critical services rely on specialized equipment and tightly integrated networks.

Private and social calculations can diverge. To an individual company, additional inventory may appear inefficient when the annual probability of disruption seems low. For society, simultaneous failures generate costs not fully captured in any one firm's books: hospital downtime, spoiled food, halted schools, missing industrial inputs, sanitary hazards and emergency government expenditure. Critical networks therefore justify coordination, minimum standards and verifiable exercises. [2][6]

The European stockpiling strategy proposed in July 2025 aims to identify gaps, reduce duplication and expand reserves of essential goods. But reserves are not the same as delivery capability. The right supplies in the wrong location, without transportation or access arrangements, may not protect people who need them. Inventories cannot replace supplier diversity, reparability, backup energy or institutional continuity. [6]

Security providers and emergency-kit manufacturers can benefit commercially from heightened concern. That creates a potential for alarmist marketing, but profitable demand does not prove that the underlying risk has been fabricated. Investigators would need to show who financed a message, which product it advertised, how purchases changed and what evidence supported the claimed threat.

10. Unequal exposure and unequal ability to prepare

“Keep ten days of supplies” has different implications for a household with disposable income and storage space and for someone paid weekly, living in a small apartment and depending on refrigerated medication. Individual readiness does not eliminate differences in income, accessibility, housing and health. Policies centered only on household purchases may transfer public responsibilities to those least able to afford them.

The 2024 Special Eurobarometer found that 29% of EU respondents reported keeping an emergency supply of beverages and food, 20% reported extra water for cooking and hygiene, and 18% had agreed with relatives or friends how to stay in contact. These were self-reported preparedness measures, not an audit of whether supplies were adequate or could actually last the claimed period. The survey also identified constraints involving resources and information. [21][22]

The limited prevalence of certain precautions helps explain government prevention campaigns independently of military escalation. At the same time, effective resilience must include community supplies, accessible communication, priority assistance, schools, care homes and people unable to store or carry reserves. The public objective is not simply to increase sales of preparedness kits, but to reduce harm from interruptions, particularly among vulnerable groups.

11. A geography of threats that cannot be flattened

Proximity to war, climate conditions and administrative capacity make national preparedness agendas different. Baltic and Nordic countries face distinct geography and civil-defense traditions compared with southern Europe. The United Kingdom draws on experience with floods, storms and service disruptions. Mediterranean countries face wildfire and heat risks. In Brazil, floods, landslides, droughts and local utility interruptions are more directly documented civil-defense concerns than a European war scenario imported without geographic adjustment. [1][4][9][10]

A risk map based only on countries publishing preparedness booklets confuses communication capacity with threat intensity. More transparent authorities may appear more alarmed precisely because they publish instructions; places with less visible guidance may have greater vulnerabilities or weaker administrative systems.

12. Four competing explanations for the news wave

Preparedness policy and information warfare can coexist under several explanations. They need not be mutually exclusive and should not receive invented probabilities.

The first explanation is directly documented. The second is plausible as a general mechanism, but its specific contribution to the November 2026 sequence has not been measured. The third is established as a broader phenomenon, not as the proven origin of stockpiling recommendations. The fourth requires particular evidence and cannot be inferred merely from defense spending or civil-protection budgets.

This framework avoids two opposite premature conclusions: “governments recommend supplies, therefore they know collapse is coming,” and “no collapse is announced, therefore preparedness is propaganda.” Both erase the difference among risk, prediction and consequence management.

13. The costs of a society convinced collapse is inevitable

Narratives of generalized collapse can generate disproportionate effects even if their predicted scenarios never occur. First comes household decision distortion. Impulsive spending can reduce liquidity and interfere with regular purchases of food and medication. Second is deteriorating trust: rumors of bank closures, supply failures and evacuation orders can lead people to dismiss future corrections and depend increasingly on anonymous sources.

Third is institutional overload. Agencies must devote personnel to answering unsourced assertions, while genuine evacuation and contamination warnings compete with fraudulent content. Fourth is political fragmentation: anxiety and misinformation together can intensify hostility between groups, encourage premature blame and reduce the scope for evidence-based policy. OECD research documents links between information integrity and institutional trust, but that does not make every expression of distrust a product of foreign interference. [23]

The opposite reaction is dangerous too. Treating all civil protection as manipulation can cause people to abandon effective, inexpensive precautions. The point is not to eliminate fear but to prevent fear from becoming the sole standard of evidence. A proportionate response accepts real hazards, demands precision and protects the capacity for cooperation.

14. Strategic intimidation, deterrence and social attrition

In interstate competition, civil resilience affects an aggressor's calculations. If a limited strike against utilities produces political disorganization, scarcity and immediate pressure on leaders, coercion may appear relatively cheap. If services have backup capacity, recovery arrangements and trusted communications, the same action is less likely to produce strategic gains. This is why NATO connects civil preparedness to credible collective defense and the reduction of opportunities for intimidation. [2][11]

The psychological effect of threats can precede physical attacks. Wartime language, frequent exercises and circulating maps of strategic targets may change household and business expectations. However, a preparedness policy is not necessarily escalation. By reducing expected returns to sabotage, it can make aggression less attractive. The same measure that appears alarming in the short run may lower vulnerability over time.

Misperception remains a risk. If every defensive drill is interpreted as an inevitable step toward war, governments may be pressured to react to intentions that have not been demonstrated. Diplomacy and strategic communication must distinguish offensive capability, actual deployment, doctrine, political intention and operational decisions. None can be inferred from a household booklet about bottled water.

15. How to investigate manipulation without speculation

A serious inquiry begins with a bounded collection of publications rather than a vague impression that “all the news says the same thing.” Each item should be preserved with a date, URL, verifiable capture, publisher, byline, language, headline and cited documents. Its assertions can then be separated into testable categories: was a new rule issued, did an official warning exist, was a shortage observed, or was the claim merely a comment about a hypothetical risk?

Distribution links come next: accounts publishing in synchronized windows, domains registered close together, copied wording, recycled visuals, paid promotion and circulation across platforms. Similar opinions or subjects do not themselves prove coordination. Impersonation operations can leave technical traces in domain registrations, server infrastructure, redirects and deceptive branding, as investigations of Doppelganger have demonstrated. [17]

Analysis of outcomes also requires independent indicators: verifiable changes in risk perception, purchase volumes, emergency-kit searches, traffic to official sources, government responses and supply-chain data. Views are not the same as belief; declared belief is not automatically behavior; behavior does not prove causation by a particular account. Strong attribution links publication, diffusion, exposure and observed effects while identifying gaps.

This approach also protects debate from circular accusations. Propaganda can cite analyses of propaganda to appear credible. Anti-disinformation programs can, if poorly designed, suppress legitimate disagreement or discredit justified criticism. Methodological transparency, opportunities to challenge findings and independent oversight are themselves parts of democratic resilience.

16. Three conditional paths, not a timetable for catastrophe

Preparedness becomes routine without systemic breakdown. Governments improve stockpiles, continuity plans, exercises, warning systems and public education. Local disruptions persist, but households come to view emergency supplies as ordinary prevention. This path depends on clear communication, observable investment and demonstrated restoration capacity.

Localized shocks in a prolonged period of tension. Sabotage, storms, digital failures and commercial interruptions generate uneven, limited episodes. Influence campaigns try to transform isolated cases into a narrative of systemic decay. The outcome depends on actual downtime, repair capability and the public's access to confirmed information.

Strategic escalation with cascading failures. Military confrontation or simultaneous major attacks generate broad disruptions to energy, logistics, health care and communications. This path requires material conditions and political decisions that cannot be read off household guidance. Relevant indicators would include verified mobilizations, attacks actually conducted, prolonged closure of transport corridors, loss of critical capability and official statements consistent with operational changes.

No numerical probability follows from the available information. The paths can be distinguished by observing actual operations, service continuity and documented decisions — not by counting survival-themed videos.

17. What governments, operators and households can do without spreading panic

Trustworthy public communication should state source, date, geographic area, type of hazard, estimated likelihood where feasible, recommended conduct and conditions under which an alert expires. The original document must remain available when social networks excerpt its message. Authorities should correct impersonation swiftly while acknowledging failures and publishing restoration indicators. Credibility is not created by asking the public to trust without evidence.

Infrastructure operators need to identify critical functions, reduce single points of failure, test restoration, protect digital identities, maintain alternative communication and coordinate with government. Household preparedness is complementary. With a hospital deprived of power, water-treatment facilities offline or logistics paralyzed, no domestic stockpile can resolve a prolonged system-wide crisis.

Households can build reserves gradually according to their circumstances, preserve printed contact details, identify verifiable information channels, maintain essential medication and plan for dependents. These actions remain useful even if no war occurs. British guidance to acquire supplies progressively, German advice to adapt reserves and Brazilian guidance emphasizing local risks converge on this principle. [7][8][10]

18. The deeper struggle concerns the interpretation of reality

Security now has a psychological dimension because public perception influences consumption, trust, investment and political legitimacy. Foreign influence operations are documented; Western planning for potential service disruptions is equally documented. The analytical error is to fuse these two observations into a single causal explanation without the missing intermediate evidence.

The West need not be close to collapse to become more vulnerable to sabotage, localized scarcity and manipulation. Nor must it be invulnerable for claims of inevitable civilizational collapse to be unfounded. Advanced economies depend on dense networks and therefore benefit from redundancy, supplies, cooperation and repair capacity.

The most corrosive information operation is not necessarily the one that persuades everyone to accept a specific falsehood. It is the one that makes it difficult to distinguish prevention from threat, possibility from fact, adversary from administrative error and a local incident from the fate of an entire civilization. Sustainable defense combines robust infrastructure, accountable institutions, verifiable journalism and the ability of citizens to prepare without turning uncertainty into certainty of catastrophe.

References

[1] UK Cabinet Office, Households encouraged to take small, simple steps to stay prepared in an emergency, 22 October 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/households-encouraged-to-take-small-simple-steps-to-stay-prepared-in-an-emergency

[2] NATO, 2026 Resilience Baseline Requirements, 15 September 2026. https://nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/09/15/2026-resilience-baseline-requirements

[3] Brazilian Ministry of Integration and Regional Development, MIDR esclarece que kit de emergência é medida preventiva e não tem relação com alerta nacional, 7 November 2026. https://www.gov.br/mdr/pt-br/noticias/midr-esclarece-que-kit-de-emergencia-e-medida-preventiva-e-nao-tem-relacao-com-alerta-nacional

[4] European Commission, Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness (Niinistö report), 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf

[5] European Commission, EU Preparedness Union Strategy, 26 March 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en

[6] European Commission, Strengthening crisis readiness and health security, 9 July 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/strengthening-crisis-readiness-and-health-security-2025-07-09_en

[7] UK Government, Be Ready: Be ready for emergencies, household guidance. https://beready.campaign.gov.uk/be-ready-for-emergencies/

[8] Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, Vorsorgen für Krisen und Katastrophen and Essen und Trinken bevorraten. https://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/Warnung-Vorsorge/Vorsorge/Ratgeber-Checkliste/ratgeber-checkliste_node.html

[9] Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, In Case of Crisis or War, 2024 edition. https://lastkaj.msb.se/Broschyren-Om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/brochure-sweden-english.pdf

[10] Mato Grosso do Sul Civil Defense, Como posso me preparar antes de um desastre?, 20 January 2026. https://www.defesacivil.ms.gov.br/fale-conosco/perguntas-frequentes/1-como-posso-me-preparar-antes-de-um-desastre/

[11] NATO, Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3

[12] The National Archives (UK), Operational Selection Policy 11: Nuclear Weapons Policy 1967–1998, including the 1980 booklet. https://cdn.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/osp11.pdf

[13] NATO, NATO’s approach to counter information threats, endorsed 18 October 2024. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2024/10/18/natos-approach-to-counter-information-threats

[14] European External Action Service, 4th EEAS Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, 12 March 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en

[15] Council of the European Union, Russia’s hybrid activities: Council prolongs restrictive measures until October 2027, 8 October 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/10/08/russia-s-hybrid-activities-council-prolongs-restrictive-measures-until-october-2027/

[16] Council of the European Union, Council adopts conclusions on advancing the EU’s capacity to counter hybrid threats, 16 March 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/16/council-adopts-conclusions-on-advancing-the-eu-s-capacity-to-counter-hybrid-threats/

[17] EU DisinfoLab, Doppelganger Hub, updated through 2026. https://www.disinfo.eu/doppelganger-hub

[18] Kasperson, R. E. et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, Risk Analysis, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1988.tb01168.x

[19] Kasperson, R. E. et al., The social amplification of risk framework: New perspectives, Risk Analysis, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13926

[20] World Health Organization, Working together to tackle the infodemic, 29 June 2020. https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/29-06-2020-working-together-to-tackle-the-infodemic-

[21] European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 547: Disaster risk awareness and preparedness of the EU population, in Safer Together, 2024, figure 6. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf

[22] European Civil Protection Knowledge Network, New EU Eurobarometer on disaster awareness and preparedness of EU citizens. https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/news/new-eu-eurobarometer-disaster-awareness-and-preparedness-eu-citizens

[23] OECD, Trust and Information Integrity, in OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions — 2024 Results. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_9a20554b-en/full-report/trust-and-information-integrity_49ce5100.html