# Global Wealth Flow Monitor — 16 September 2026

## Executive Assessment

**Observed fact — high confidence.** Global capital remains concentrated in U.S. financial markets rather than showing a clean break away from dollar assets. The latest available U.S. Treasury TIC release, for June, recorded a net inflow of $133.5 billion and adjusted net foreign purchases of long-term securities of $172.7 billion. July data were scheduled for 16 September at 4 p.m. Washington time and were not yet available at this report's cutoff. This is a flow measure, not a change in net global wealth.

**Observed fact — high confidence.** Official reserve diversification is gradual and valuation-sensitive. IMF COFER puts global foreign-exchange reserves at $13.10 trillion in 2026Q1 and the dollar share at 57.13%, up from 56.42% in 2025Q4. The IMF attributes roughly half of the quarterly increase in the dollar share to exchange-rate valuation. Gold therefore cannot be read as a one-for-one transfer out of dollars.

**Observed fact — medium-high confidence.** Central-bank gold demand rebounded sharply in 2026Q2 after a revised weak first quarter. The World Gold Council estimates 289 tonnes of net purchases in Q2 versus a revised 57 tonnes in Q1; first-half demand of 345 tonnes was the lowest first-half total since 2022. This is a quantity flow into official gold holdings; the rise in the market value of existing gold is a separate valuation effect.

**Observed fact — high confidence.** Cross-border bank credit expanded strongly in 2026Q1. BIS locational statistics show cross-border bank claims rising $2.1 trillion on an exchange-rate- and break-adjusted basis, or about $1.6 trillion after seasonal adjustment. Credit to emerging and developing economies rose $148 billion, concentrated in Africa and the Middle East and emerging Europe. Claims are financial positions and should not be added to portfolio holdings as if they were independent net wealth.

**Observed fact — high confidence.** Productive investment is becoming more concentrated in AI infrastructure, semiconductors, critical minerals and energy-transition activities. UNCTAD reports global FDI of $1.6 trillion in 2025, up 6%, while strategic sectors accounted for 44% of global announced new investment projects project value, up from 16% in 2020. The top three recipient economies captured 56% of strategic-sector project value.

**Observed fact — high confidence.** Energy is redistributing current income toward exporters while also increasing the value of energy-security infrastructure. EIA's September outlook estimates Brent at about $91/bbl in 2026, compared with $69 in 2025, and says global oil inventories fell by about 400 million barrels through its early-September cutoff. This is primarily an income and price effect, not a transfer of ownership.

**Analysis — medium-high confidence.** The physical side of AI investment is increasingly important to capital allocation. EIA expects U.S. electricity sales to rise almost 2% in 2026 and again in 2027, with data centres and manufacturing driving commercial and industrial demand. Capital spending therefore increasingly reaches generation, grids, cooling, construction and gas infrastructure in addition to chips and software.

**Analysis — high confidence.** Mineral supply-chain influence is moving less through ownership of underground reserves than through refining and processing capacity. IEA says the average share of the largest refined supplier across key energy minerals reached 70% in 2025, up from 68% in 2020. Indonesia led recent nickel supply growth while China remained the leading refined supplier for most other key energy minerals.

## Horizon map: one week, one month, three months and one year

The **one-week** change is dominated by energy and infrastructure signals rather than new comprehensive financial-flow datasets. EIA's 9 September outlook raised the importance of sustained oil-market disruption and confirmed record U.S. electricity generation linked partly to data centres and manufacturing. These are current price/income and capacity-demand signals.

Over **one month**, the latest completed TIC month available at cutoff remains June: $133.5 billion of net TIC inflows. Central-bank gold data still show the Q2 rebound rather than a new monthly global aggregate. The correct conclusion is data continuity, not a fabricated seven-day flow.

Over **three months**, the combined April-June TIC releases show persistent foreign demand for U.S. long-term securities, while BIS Q1 data establish that bank balance-sheet expansion was also broad. These are different channels and cannot be summed without reconciliation.

Over **one year**, the clearest structural change is the composition of new productive investment. UNCTAD's 2025 data show a larger share of new investment projects value in strategic sectors; IEA shows record refining concentration; EIA now observes electricity demand growth from data centres and manufacturing. The evidence supports a shift in incremental investment toward compute, electricity, energy security and critical-material processing, not a wholesale relocation of the existing global financial-asset stock.

## Geographic and cross-asset flows

The United States remains the main destination for internationally traded financial capital in the available monthly data. June TIC showed $207.1 billion of net foreign purchases of U.S. long-term securities before U.S. purchases of foreign securities and other adjustments. Private foreign investors accounted for $169.8 billion and official institutions for $37.3 billion.

Developing Asia remained the largest developing-region FDI recipient in 2025 at $644 billion. Latin America and the Caribbean received $188 billion, up 14%, while Africa received about $70 billion. These FDI flows are not equivalent to portfolio flows: they imply a longer-sensitivity to long-term interest rates ownership or control relationship, although headline FDI can still contain financial-centre and corporate-restructuring effects.

## Reserves, currencies and official gold

COFER shows $13.10 trillion of global foreign-exchange reserves in 2026Q1. The dollar share rose to 57.13%. This does not establish renewed structural dollarisation because exchange-rate valuation explains a material part of the move. Conversely, gold's rising share in broader reserve portfolios should not automatically be labelled de-dollarisation when the increase reflects a higher gold price.

Official gold buying was 57 tonnes in Q1 and 289 tonnes in Q2 according to the revised World Gold Council series. The first-half total was 345 tonnes. Poland was the largest reported buyer in Q2 and China accelerated reported accumulation. The evidence supports continued diversification demand but rejects a smooth, continuously accelerating purchase path.

## Sovereign debt, equities, credit and portfolio flows

June TIC shows that foreign investors continued to absorb U.S. long-term securities. The sequence from April ($103.1 billion adjusted long-term net foreign purchases), May ($232.7 billion) and June ($172.7 billion) indicates persistent demand, though monthly volatility is substantial.

This is not proof that every country is increasing Treasury exposure: TIC country attribution is affected by custodians and financial centres, and the aggregate includes multiple security classes. The next July release was due after this report's cutoff.

## Banks and cross-border credit

BIS reports a $2.1 trillion increase in cross-border bank claims in 2026Q1, adjusted for exchange rates and breaks. After seasonal adjustment the increase was about $1.6 trillion. Credit to emerging and developing economies rose $148 billion, led by Africa and the Middle East and emerging Europe. Foreign-currency credit in both dollars and euros expanded, with euro credit growing faster.

The main interpretation is an expansion of cross-border intermediation, not $2.1 trillion of newly created global net wealth. A bank claim has a corresponding liability elsewhere.

## Sovereign wealth and state capital

No new globally comparable weekly sovereign-wealth-fund dataset was available at cutoff. The relevant structural signal remains the use of state capital to finance infrastructure, energy, technology and overseas assets. This monitor therefore does not assign a weekly SWF flow where no harmonised source exists.

## FDI, new investment projects and M&A

UNCTAD's consolidated 2025 estimate puts global FDI at $1.6 trillion, up 6%. Developed-economy inflows rose 11%; developing-economy inflows rose 2% to $901 billion. More than 80% of global FDI went to the top 20 host economies.

Strategic-sector new investment projects projects reached 44% of global announced project value in 2025, versus 16% in 2020. Announced value in those sectors rose from $109 billion to $576 billion over five years. This is a strong signal about the direction of planned productive capacity, but announced projects are not the same as realised capital expenditure.

## Energy

EIA's September STEO estimates Brent at an average $91/bbl in 2026 and $74 in 2027, with roughly 400 million barrels of global inventory draw through the forecast cutoff. It assumes continuing constraints on Middle Eastern exports through 2026Q4.

For natural gas, U.S. inventories are expected to enter winter above the five-year average. U.S. LNG gross exports are forecast at 17 Bcf/d in 2026 and 19 Bcf/d in 2027. The combination redistributes income toward producers and infrastructure owners when international prices are high, but it does not by itself transfer asset ownership.

## Strategic minerals

IEA reports record concentration in refining in 2025. The largest refined supplier averaged a 70% share across key energy minerals. Indonesia accounted for much of recent nickel growth; China led most other key refined mineral chains. Rare-earth refining was an exception to the recent concentration trend, with new U.S. projects and higher Malaysian production modestly reducing concentration.

USGS's 2026 Mineral Commodity Summaries remains the baseline for mine production, reserves and trade across copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earths and iron ore. Reserve location, mine output and processing control are kept separate in this monitor.

## Productive capacity: chips, batteries, processing, data centres and grids

UNCTAD's new investment projects data show capital concentrating in AI infrastructure, semiconductors, critical minerals and energy-transition activities. EIA expects U.S. electricity generation to reach a record 4,368 TWh in 2026, with data-centre development and manufacturing contributing to demand growth. Commercial electricity sales are forecast to rise 3.3% in 2026.

The transmission mechanism is concrete: more compute requires chips, buildings, cooling, grid connections and generation. Where grid connection, generation or construction capacity cannot expand at the same speed, those constraints can delay deployment and redirect investment geographically.

## Wealth Transfer Matrix

| Origin | Destination | Mechanism | Evidence | Classification | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Foreign private and official investors | U.S. securities | Portfolio purchases | June TIC net inflow $133.5bn; adjusted long-term purchases $172.7bn | Observed flow | High |
| Banks and wholesale financing markets | Cross-border borrowers | Bank credit expansion | BIS Q1 claims +$2.1tn; seasonally adjusted about +$1.6tn | Observed financial flow | High |
| Central banks selling reserve currencies or adding new reserves | Official gold holdings | Net physical gold purchases | WGC Q1 57t; Q2 289t | Observed/estimated quantity flow | Medium-high |
| Global investors and corporations | AI, chips, minerals and energy infrastructure | new investment projects commitments | Strategic sectors 44% of 2025 new investment projects value | Structural investment signal | High |
| Oil-importing economies | Oil exporters | Higher unit energy payments | Brent forecast materially above 2025 average; inventory draw | Income redistribution, not ownership transfer | Medium-high |
| Electricity consumers/investors | Power and grid assets | New demand and capital expenditure | U.S. electricity demand rising with data centres/manufacturing | Structural capacity signal | High |

## Relative changes in capacity

**Gaining relative capacity:** U.S. financial markets continue to intermediate large international flows; countries and firms controlling scalable refining, electricity, grid equipment and data-centre construction gain relevance to new investment; Indonesia's role in nickel processing and China's broad refining position remain material.

**Not confirmed as losing structural capacity:** the dollar reserve system. The latest COFER quarter actually shows a higher dollar share, partly due to FX valuation. A secular diversification debate remains valid, but the current quarter does not establish an abrupt break.

## Preliminary versus confirmed signals

**Confirmed:** strong Q1 cross-border bank expansion; continued U.S. portfolio inflows through June; Q2 rebound in official gold buying; increased strategic-sector share of new investment projects investment; high mineral-refining concentration.

**Preliminary:** whether higher energy prices persist long enough to materially alter current-account positions; whether data-centre electricity demand causes durable geographic relocation of compute investment; whether new rare-earth projects materially reduce refining concentration beyond the modest 2023-25 improvement.

## Second-order risks

A prolonged oil disruption can raise transport and industrial costs, slow disinflation and keep financing costs higher. Rapid electricity demand growth can increase competition for grid connections and generation, affecting industrial location. Concentrated mineral processing can turn trade restrictions or operational disruptions into downstream manufacturing shocks. Strong cross-border credit growth can support investment but also transmit financing stress faster if global risk appetite reverses.

## Indicators for the next monitor

1. July TIC data once released and any revisions to April-June.
2. COFER 2026Q2 when available, separating FX valuation from quantity.
3. Monthly reported central-bank gold transactions and WGC revisions.
4. BIS next international banking release and the geographic distribution of EMDE credit.
5. Brent, physical inventory draws and Hormuz export capacity.
6. U.S. electricity load, data-centre interconnection queues and generation additions.
7. New critical-mineral refining projects and changes in export restrictions.
8. new investment projects project cancellations or final investment decisions in AI, chips, energy and minerals.

## Sources and limitations

Primary sources: IMF COFER (1 July 2026); BIS international banking statistics (end-March 2026 release); U.S. Treasury TIC (June 2026, released 17 August); UNCTAD World Investment Report 2026; EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (9 September 2026); IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026; USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026. World Gold Council data are used for estimated official gold demand because no single official global source provides timely complete physical purchase estimates.

The monitor deliberately does not add financial assets, bank claims, reserves, resource values and physical infrastructure into one global wealth total. Frequencies differ, many series are revised, and price changes can alter reported positions without any transfer of ownership.

### Source links
- https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20july%201
- https://www.bis.org/publications/202607-commentary-ibs-gli
- https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0606
- https://home.treasury.gov/data/treasury-international-capital-tic-system/release-dates-of-tic-data
- https://unctad.org/news/global-investment-rises-6-16-trillion-development-gains-remain-uneven
- https://unctad.org/news/investment-strategic-sectors-expanding-many-developing-economies-risk-being-left-behind
- https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-q2-2026/central-banks
- https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/
- https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/market-overview
- https://www.usgs.gov/publications/mineral-commodity-summaries-2026