Global Wealth & Power Flows — September 2026

1. Executive Assessment

1. Observed fact — high confidence. The United States remains the world's primary financial reservoir. In 2025, global equity market capitalization reached approximately US$157.8 trillion and global fixed income about US$160.7 trillion; the U.S. accounted for roughly 43.7% of equities and 38.1% of fixed income. This measures the location and depth of markets, not national net wealth.

2. Observed fact — high confidence. The reserve system remains dollar-centered. The IMF recorded US$13.10 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves in Q1 2026, down from US$13.15 trillion in Q4 2025, with the dollar share at 57.13%, up from 56.42%. The quarterly move does not support a narrative of linear abandonment of the dollar.

3. Revised observed fact — high confidence. The World Gold Council/Metals Focus revised net central-bank purchases in Q1 2026 from 244 tonnes to 57 tonnes, after new data and the reclassification of part of previously official-sector demand into OTC. In Q2 2026, the estimate was 289 tonnes, five times the revised Q1 figure. The correct signal is therefore not “continuous acceleration since Q1,” but a sharp revised slowdown in Q1 followed by a very strong rebound in Q2. The revision is material and prevents the use of 244 tonnes as evidence of physical official-sector flow.

4. Observed fact — high confidence. Sovereign wealth funds manage more than US$16 trillion, according to the IMF, compared with roughly US$3 trillion in 2008. This capital converts resource income, fiscal surpluses and reserves into global financial and productive ownership.

5. Observed fact — high confidence. International portfolio positions reached approximately US$89 trillion in June 2025, up 11.6% in six months. The IMF attributed 9.1 percentage points of the increase to price/FX effects and only 2.5 percentage points to net acquisitions. Valuation therefore dominated the observed expansion in the stock.

6. Observed fact — high confidence. The BIS recorded an increase of US$2.1 trillion in cross-border bank claims in Q1 2026, adjusted for exchange-rate changes and breaks in series. Cross-border bank credit increased by US$1.7 trillion and was 11% above a year earlier. This is an expansion of intermediation, not equivalent creation of net wealth.

7. Observed fact — high confidence. UNCTAD consolidated global 2025 FDI at approximately US$1.6 trillion, +6%, replacing the earlier preliminary estimate of +14%. The top 20 destinations received more than 80% of the total; strategic sectors reached 44% of global greenfield-project value, up from 16% in 2020.

8. Inference — high confidence. The system is evolving toward a dual concentration: the U.S. in finance, technology and asset monetization; China and Asian hubs in processing, manufacturing and physical supply chains; energy exporters and sovereign funds convert resource income into global ownership. The relevant competition is over financing + energy + processing + compute + intellectual property.

2. Methodology: stock is not flow

There is no single methodologically clean number for “global wealth” obtained by adding equities, bonds, reserves, real estate, mineral deposits and intellectual property. A bond is an asset to the creditor and a liability to the issuer; corporate market capitalization incorporates expectations about physical and intangible assets; foreign-exchange reserves are official assets and liabilities of other issuers; underground resources are not equivalent to liquid tradable assets.

This report separates four dimensions: stock (where an asset is registered/owned), flow (how much capital actually changed owner or jurisdiction), valuation (price/FX change) and change of control (who gained decision-making power over productive capacity or infrastructure). Whenever a source revises a series, the latest version available through September 15, 2026 prevails and any material revision is stated explicitly.

3. Financial assets and debt

The financial center of gravity remains American. The depth of U.S. markets provides liquidity, collateral and scale to absorb global savings. That creates a cumulative advantage, but also concentrates risk: long rates, fiscal policy and U.S. valuations transmit wealth shocks globally even without a physical capital flow.

1M: price dominates changes in the stock. 3M: net issuance, TIC and bank flows become more important. 1Y: U.S. concentration remains structural. 5Y: Asian markets have gained scale, but still do not provide an equivalent substitute combining currency, collateral, openness and depth.

4. Foreign-exchange reserves and currencies

The IMF's COFER for Q1 2026 records US$13.10 trillion in reserves and a 57.13% dollar share. The series underwent a methodological change: starting in 2025Q3, with historical revisions, the IMF eliminated the “unallocated” portion in order to present full currency composition. Long-run comparisons must respect this break.

Inference — high confidence. The base case is incremental diversification, not binary replacement of the dollar. Quarterly shares can move because of FX and valuation without an equivalent shift in central-bank allocation decisions.

5. Official gold — critical revision incorporated

The initial Gold Demand Trends Q1 2026 estimate indicated 244 tonnes of net official purchases. Gold Demand Trends Q2 2026, published on July 30, 2026, revised Q1 to 57 tonnes, after new data and the reclassification of demand previously attributed to central banks into OTC. The same publication estimated 289 tonnes in Q2 2026.

Analytical consequences:

• Quantity: Q1 2026 was much weaker than initially estimated; there is no basis for claiming continuous acceleration in official purchases at the start of the year.
• Flow: the rebound to 289 tonnes in Q2 is relevant, but a single strong quarter does not by itself prove a regime change.
• Price: gold appreciation can raise gold's share of reserves even without physical acquisition.
• Classification: reclassifications between the official sector and OTC can retrospectively alter the interpretation of flows; physical tonnage should therefore always carry a source date/version.

Revised inference — medium-high confidence. Official gold diversification remains structurally relevant, but the intensity of 2026 is more irregular than the prior version of this report implied. The evidence supports diversification and counterparty-risk management, not a conclusion that the dollar-centered monetary architecture is about to be replaced.

6. International portfolio positions

In June 2025, international portfolio positions totaled about US$89 trillion, up 11.6% in six months. Roughly four fifths of the increase came from valuation/FX. This illustrates why “growth in external assets” cannot automatically be translated into “capital inflow.” The next semiannual data point, covering December 2025, was scheduled by the IMF for September 23, 2026; this edition does not anticipate data that had not yet been published.

7. Banks and cross-border credit

The BIS recorded +US$2.1 trillion in cross-border bank claims in Q1 2026, on a basis adjusted for exchange-rate changes and breaks; cross-border bank credit rose by US$1.7 trillion and 11% year over year. In Q4 2025, claims had increased by US$994 billion. The sequence points to renewed expansion in international intermediation, but a breakdown by counterparty, currency and sector is required before it can be classified as productive financing.

8. Sovereign wealth funds and state capital

9. FDI, greenfield and change of control

UNCTAD's consolidated 2025 reading is US$1.6 trillion in FDI, +6%, not +14%: the latter was preliminary data published in January 2026. Developed economies grew 11%; developing economies, 2%, to about US$901 billion. The 20 largest recipients concentrated more than 80% of the total. Strategic sectors accounted for 44% of greenfield value, up from 16% in 2020.

Inference — high confidence. Productive investment is becoming more concentrated geographically and by sector, especially in digital infrastructure and AI. This increases agglomeration economies and also dependence on energy, grids, chips and minerals.

10. Energy

Geological reserves, production, refining, transport and corporate control are different dimensions. Income captured by a producer depends on extraction capacity, cost, logistics access, refining, sanctions and demand. The expansion of AI and data centers makes electricity and grids a direct part of the technology-wealth map: compute capital without firm electrical capacity is an asset constrained by physical infrastructure.

Structural change — high confidence. Future energy advantage will not be measured only in barrels or cubic meters in reserve, but by the ability to deliver reliable electricity, connect new load and finance grids and generation.

11. Strategic minerals

The location of the ore body alone does not determine value capture. Mining, processing, refining, component manufacturing and intellectual property can occur in different jurisdictions. Chinese concentration in processing and smelting creates economic power even when the geological reserve is located in third countries.

12. Productive capacity, semiconductors and AI

Semiconductors, data centers, electricity and grids have become a single capital system. Growth in digital investment shifts demand toward transformers, generation, transmission, copper, cooling and construction. The marginal bottleneck can move quickly from chips to power or grid connection.

Inference — high confidence. Future AI income is likely to be captured by a combination of intellectual property, compute, energy, financing and distribution scale. Countries that control only one of these factors remain dependent on the others.

13. Real and intangible assets

Real estate, land, infrastructure, brands, software and patents are not added to corporate market value to produce a “global total,” because that would create double counting. Intangible assets are analyzed by their ability to generate income, barriers to entry and technological control, not through an attempt at aggregated valuation that is not comparable across countries.

14. Wealth Transfer Matrix

15. Relative winners and losers

United States: gains from financial depth, technology and the ability to monetize assets; risk lies in valuations and power/grid constraints. China: gains from control over processing and manufacturing; risks include external demand, fragmentation and technology restrictions. Gulf/resource exporters with SWFs: gain by converting resource income into diversified assets. Extraction-only countries: can lose relative share if they do not move into processing and technology. Economies with slow power-grid expansion: risk losing digital capex even when they have capital and demand.

16. Comparison: 1M / 3M / 1Y / 5Y

1M: price and FX movements dominate financial assets; do not infer structural transfer. 3M: revised gold data changes the narrative: weak Q1 (57 t) followed by strong Q2 (289 t). 1Y: FDI and cross-border credit show concentration and renewed expansion, respectively. 5Y: sovereign capital, digital infrastructure, mineral processing and electrification have become more important mechanisms for capturing future income.

17. Regime change

The regime is neither “de-dollarization” nor “the end of globalization.” It is a more selective globalization in which private and state capital seek strategic assets while economic-security policy changes the location of capacity. Finance remains highly integrated; physical supply chains are becoming more politicized.

18. Scenarios

Base case — medium-high confidence: the dollar preserves centrality; gold retains a diversification role; strategic FDI remains concentrated; AI capex sustains demand for chips and power.

Accelerated fragmentation — scenario: export controls, sanctions, local-content rules and subsidies duplicate capacity and reduce efficiency. The cost of economic security rises and increases demand for capital.

Decompression — scenario: lower geopolitical tension and normalized bottlenecks broaden investment toward destinations currently excluded. Concentration falls marginally, but scale economies preserve existing hubs.

19. Early-warning indicators

1. COFER: USD share adjusted for FX effects where possible.
2. Gold: revised official tonnage, not only initial estimates; compare WGC/Metals Focus with central-bank disclosures.
3. PIP/CPIS: decomposition between valuation and net acquisition.
4. BIS: claims and credit by currency, counterparty and sector.
5. FDI: distinguish preliminary monitors from consolidated WIR figures.
6. Greenfield AI/data-center projects and associated electrical capacity.
7. Processing/refining of copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earths.
8. SWF capex and asset allocation.
9. Grid-connection lead times and transmission investment.
10. Trade restrictions and technology controls.

20. Conclusion

Where is wealth leaving from? There is no single source. Private savings continue to be channeled into deep financial markets; resource revenues feed sovereign funds; official reserves are marginally diversified; corporate capital migrates toward strategic infrastructure.

Where is it going? Into liquid U.S. markets, diversified sovereign assets, digital infrastructure, semiconductors, energy, grids and processing stages with high barriers to entry.

Who is increasing its ability to capture future income? Jurisdictions and companies that combine financing, energy, processing, compute, intellectual property and scale. Ownership of geological reserves alone is not enough.

The gold correction changes one important conclusion: 2026 does not show smooth acceleration in official purchases. Q1 was revised from 244 tonnes to 57 tonnes and Q2 rebounded to 289 tonnes. The strategic diversification trend remains, but its intensity must be treated as volatile and subject to statistical revision.

Primary sources and version control

• World Gold Council / Metals Focus — Gold Demand Trends Q2 2026, July 30, 2026: Q1 2026 revised from 244 t to 57 t; Q2 2026 = 289 t. This version supersedes the initial GDT Q1 2026 estimate for official purchases.
• IMF — COFER Data Brief, Q1 2026, published July 2026: reserves US$13.10T; USD 57.13%; COFER series with revised methodology.
• BIS — International banking statistics, end-March 2026, published July 2026: cross-border claims +US$2.1T; cross-border credit +US$1.7T.
• UNCTAD — World Investment Report 2026, July 2026: 2025 FDI US$1.6T, +6%; this consolidated reading supersedes the preliminary +14% estimate in the January 2026 Global Investment Trends Monitor.
• IMF — PIP/CPIS: June 2025 international portfolio positions and the valuation/acquisition decomposition.
• IMF — sovereign wealth fund analysis, 2026: more than US$16T under management.
• IEA / USGS / EIA and national statistics: energy, grids and minerals; series used only when comparable and with the relevant period identified.

QA note: this revision explicitly incorporates statistical revisions published before the edition date and applies the rule that, when a preliminary estimate conflicts with a consolidated/revised series from the same institution, the latest version available at the cutoff date prevails.