Global Wealth Flow Monitor

1. Executive Assessment

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] The reserve system remains dollar-centered. The IMF recorded US$13.10 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves in Q1 2026 and a 57.13% dollar share, up from 56.42% in Q4 2025. There is no evidence of a rapid break in the reserve currency regime.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] Official gold demand remained positive, but was far more uneven than the original reading suggested. The WGC revised Q1 2026 from 244 tonnes to 57 tonnes and recorded 289 tonnes in Q2 2026; H1 2026 totaled 345 tonnes, the weakest first half since 2022. The correct thesis is persistent but uneven official diversification — not continuous acceleration throughout the first half. September-reported data indicate more recent acceleration in Chinese purchases, with double-digit monthly buying since May. Confidence: high for the quarterly revision; medium-high for extrapolating China's recent pace.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] Asian FX buffers moved in different directions. India reached US$785.7 billion in the week ended September 4, +US$44.9 billion; Japan ended August with US$1.208 trillion, -US$79.6 billion in an intervention context; China ended August near US$3.438 trillion, +US$19.5 billion on the month. Accumulation, intervention and valuation must not be conflated.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] The United States continues to absorb foreign capital at scale. June TIC showed total net inflows of US$133.5 billion and adjusted long-term net purchases of US$172.7 billion. April, May and June were positive in aggregate TIC.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] Cross-border bank credit accelerated in Q1 2026. The BIS reported a US$2.1 trillion increase in cross-border claims; this represents expansion of intermediation and balance sheets, not equivalent creation of net wealth.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] FDI is growing, but concentrating in a small number of destinations and strategic sectors. UNCTAD recorded global FDI of US$1.6 trillion in 2025, +6%; more than 80% went to the top 20 destinations. Strategic sectors reached 44% of greenfield-project value, up from 16% in 2020.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] The mineral bottleneck is more concentrated in processing than in geology. The IEA estimates an average top-three-country share of 86% in refining for six key minerals in 2024, up from roughly 82% in 2020; Indonesia leads incremental nickel growth and China the other major links.

1. [Observed fact + inference · medium-high confidence] Energy is again redistributing income between importers and producers. The EIA's September STEO describes global inventories compressed by production disruptions. While the shock persists, nominal income shifts toward producers, exporters and logistics; this is not equivalent to permanent transfer of ownership.

1. [Observed fact · high confidence] AI converts financial capital into long-lived physical assets. The IEA estimates capex above US$400 billion in 2025 for five large technology companies, with potential further expansion in 2026. Electricity, grids, chips, cooling, copper and equipment become links in income capture.

1. [Preliminary signal · medium confidence] Asian flows remain divergent. Japanese savings move between foreign asset classes while the state uses reserves; China maintains a large external buffer while domestic credit remains weak. External financial capacity does not imply strong domestic absorption.

2. Map of geographic and cross-asset flows

3. Foreign-exchange reserves, currencies and gold

Official monetary system

IMF COFER, with the latest observation in Q1 2026, shows US$13.10 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves and the dollar at 57.13%. The comparison with Q4 2025 (56.42%) contradicts a narrative of an immediate dollar collapse. The value of gold in reserves can rise through physical buying, price appreciation or FX; only physical purchase/sale is an allocation flow.

1 week: India +US$44.9bn to US$785.7bn in the week through September 4. 1 month: Japan -US$79.6bn in August to US$1.208tn; China +US$19.5bn to ~US$3.438tn. 3 months: COFER does not have weekly frequency; currency composition remains structurally stable. 1 year: gold gained relevance, but there is no dollar-for-dollar equivalence between gold appreciation and sales of dollar reserves.

Official gold — revised series

Gold Demand Trends Q2 2026, published by the World Gold Council on July 30, 2026, materially revised the Q1 2026 estimate: from 244 tonnes to 57 tonnes. The 187-tonne difference was reclassified into OTC and other demand based on new data and analysis. In Q2 2026, net central-bank demand was 289 tonnes, five times revised Q1 and a record for a second quarter; H1 2026 totaled 345 tonnes, the weakest first half since 2022.

The interpretation changes in magnitude: there was no continuous official acceleration in Q1 2026. There was a weak first quarter, affected by sales from some agents, followed by a strong rebound in the second. The WGC also records that China increased the pace of accumulation in reported data and, in September, stated that monthly Chinese purchases had been in double digits since May. This supports a thesis of incremental diversification, but with high quarterly variability.

Correct decomposition:

Δ value of official gold = physical purchases/sales + price change + FX effect.

Stock appreciation should not be counted as flow. The WGC demand series also remains subject to revisions as data on unreported operations emerge.

4. Treasuries, bonds, equities, credit and portfolio

June TIC shows total net inflows of US$133.5bn and adjusted long-term net purchases of US$172.7bn. May recorded US$132.2bn and April US$26.1bn in aggregate. The sequence confirms foreign demand, although country attribution is imperfect because of custodians and financial centers.

The Treasury's annual survey for June 2025 recorded US$6.598 trillion in U.S. securities held by foreign official institutions. In Japan, August data show ¥1.3tn directed toward foreign equities while external bond positions declined: capital outflow can coexist with rotation between asset classes.

1W: no new TIC observation at the cutoff date. 1M: strong U.S. absorption and Japanese rotation toward equities. 3M: April–June TIC positive. 1Y: foreign stock of U.S. assets remains high; no evidence of abrupt disintermediation.

5. Banks and cross-border credit

The BIS reported a US$2.1tn increase in cross-border bank claims in Q1 2026. A measure with additional adjustments points to around US$1.6tn, still a very strong expansion. Claims are assets of one agent and liabilities/obligations of another; they must not be added to global net wealth as newly created wealth.

In China, new bank loans of only ¥60bn in August, after a ¥340bn contraction in July, provide a domestic counterpoint: a large external position does not imply strong internal demand for credit.

6. Sovereign wealth funds and state capital

Sovereign capital continues to convert fiscal and energy revenues and financial returns into global assets and domestic capacity. Norway's Government Pension Fund Global returned 9.4% in the first half of 2026; market gains raise the stock without representing an equivalent fiscal contribution. Saudi Arabia's PIF, in its 2025 annual report released in 2026, emphasizes capital mobilization and strategic domestic ecosystems.

Inference · high confidence: the function of major sovereign wealth funds is becoming dual: preserve international financial wealth and finance domestic industrial, technological, logistics and energy capacity.

7. FDI, greenfield and M&A

UNCTAD recorded global FDI of US$1.6tn in 2025, +6%. More than 80% went to the top 20 destinations. Strategic sectors rose from 16% of greenfield value in 2020 to 44% in 2025. The structural signal is concentration of marginal investment in digital/AI infrastructure, semiconductors, energy and critical minerals.

There is no new comparable weekly FDI observation that would justify extrapolating this movement as a seven-day flow; the reading is annual/structural.

8. Energy: oil, gas, uranium and electricity

The EIA's September STEO describes global inventories compressed by production disruptions and elevated prices until flows normalize and inventories rebuild. Higher prices shift current income from consumers/importers toward producers/exporters, but do not automatically transfer ownership of assets.

In electricity, the IEA projects meaningful demand growth associated with data centers. The wealth effect appears in grid connection, firm generation, transmission, transformers, storage, cooling and energized land. For uranium, there is no new comparable official series in this weekly window sufficient to claim a quantitative global change; it remains a structural theme tied to nuclear expansion and energy security.

9. Strategic minerals

The IEA shows an average 86% concentration in the top three refiners of six key minerals in 2024, versus ~82% in 2020. The leading supplier accounted for nearly all recent growth in refined supply — Indonesia in nickel and China in the other major minerals.

• Copper: Chinese smelting/refining maintains significant industrial value capture.
• Lithium: lower prices and capex discipline can affect future supply; this should not be confused with an immediate loss of geological reserves.
• Nickel: Indonesia remains the dominant hub of incremental refined supply.
• Cobalt: the chain remains concentrated; LFP chemistry reduces some demand pressure.
• Rare earths: projects outside China represent marginal diversification, still insufficient to change the regime.
• Iron ore: no comparable structural weekly evidence; an isolated spot price does not prove a change in power.

10. Productive capacity

The AI chain converts cash and financing into infrastructure:

The IEA reports capex above US$400bn in 2025 for five large technology companies and potential further expansion in 2026. UNCTAD identifies data centers as a central vector of strategic greenfield investment. Income-capture power shifts toward whoever controls scarce capacity — advanced chips, electrical connections, generation, equipment, cooling, grid infrastructure and suitable land.

11. Wealth Transfer Matrix

12. Relative winners and losers

Relative winners: the U.S. as a financial center; China/Indonesia in mineral processing; energy producers while the shock persists; regions with electricity/grid capacity for AI; India in external-defense capacity. Under pressure: net energy importers in a prolonged shock; Japan because of the cost of FX defense; economies outside strategic-FDI hubs; miners without local processing.

The gold revision reduces the force of interpreting central banks as “winners through accumulation” in Q1 2026: the correct evidence is a strong rebound in Q2, not continuous acceleration through the half-year.

13. Preliminary signals versus confirmed changes

Confirmed

• Higher concentration of greenfield investment in strategic sectors.
• High concentration of critical-mineral refining.
• Growth in electricity demand associated with data centers.
• The dollar remains the main reserve currency.
• Strong expansion of cross-border bank credit in Q1 2026.
• Official gold demand was weak in Q1 2026 and rebounded strongly in Q2 after statistical revision.

Preliminary

• Recent acceleration of Chinese gold purchases since May.
• Japanese rotation from external bonds into equities.
• Exceptional increase in Indian reserves.
• Possible battery-material capex cuts reinforcing future concentration.

Not yet confirmed

• Structural rupture of dollar dominance.
• Broad deconcentration of critical minerals.
• Permanent income transfer to oil producers.
• Structural repatriation of Japanese capital.
• Linear and continuous acceleration of global central-bank gold buying.

14. Second-order risks

1. Energy → inflation → yields → valuation.
2. AI → electricity → metals/equipment: the bottleneck can migrate from GPUs to grids and generation.
3. Minerals → industrial policy → fragmentation: resilience may require duplicated capacity and subsidies.
4. Asian FX → reserves → Treasuries: intervention should not be treated as structural Treasury selling without confirmation.
5. Concentrated capex → geographic concentration of productivity.
6. Cross-border credit → financial vulnerability: more liquidity also increases interconnection.
7. Statistical revisions → narrative risk: estimates of unreported flows, such as official gold, can be materially reclassified; conclusions should preserve confidence ranges and vintage dates.

15. Indicators for next week

1. U.S. July TIC: persistence and composition of foreign inflows.
2. Brent, physical flows and inventories: duration of the energy-income transfer.
3. Reserves/intervention in Japan, India and China: separate valuation, swaps and transactions.
4. Official gold: PBoC and other central banks; track reported tonnes and new WGC revisions.
5. Chinese credit/activity.
6. U.S. long yields versus AI capex.
7. Energy/data-center projects, connection queues and regulatory delays.
8. Critical minerals: export controls, new refining projects and capex cuts.

Strategic conclusion

The revised reading is not a simple migration of wealth “from West to East” or “from the dollar to gold.” International capital remains strongly attracted to the United States; Asian reserves move for different reasons; sovereign capital transforms revenues and returns into strategic capacity; and marginal productive investment concentrates in AI, energy, semiconductors and mineral processing.

The gold revision is material: Q1 2026 had only 57 tonnes of estimated net central-bank demand, not 244 tonnes. Q2 2026, at 289 tonnes, shows a strong rebound. Official gold diversification therefore remains a plausible and observable longer-run trend, but the 2026 path is uneven and does not support a narrative of uninterrupted quarterly acceleration. Metal-price appreciation must still be separated from physical purchasing.

The most relevant transfer of power remains the ability to transform resources and financing into processing, technology and scarce infrastructure. The main evidence against accelerated financial fragmentation is persistent capital absorption by the United States; evidence for diversification lies in industrial policy, selective gold accumulation and expansion of strategic assets. These trends can coexist.

Main sources and statistical cutoff

• IMF, COFER, Q1 2026: https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20july%201
• BIS, International Banking Statistics, end-March 2026: https://www.bis.org/publications/202607-commentary-ibs-gli
• U.S. Treasury, TIC June 2026: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0606
• Japan Ministry of Finance, August 2026 reserves: https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/international_policy/reference/official_reserve_assets/e0808.html
• World Gold Council, Gold Demand Trends Q2 2026, July 30, 2026 (revised series): https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-q2-2026/central-banks
• World Gold Council, Q1 2026 errata/revision: https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-q1-2026
• World Gold Council, central-bank statistics, September 2026: https://www.gold.org/goldhub/gold-focus/2026/09/central-bank-gold-statistics-central-banks-make-positive-headlines-gold
• UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2026: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1324/world-investment-report-2026-international-investment-in-a-turbulent-era
• UNCTAD, strategic sectors: https://unctad.org/news/investment-strategic-sectors-expanding-many-developing-economies-risk-being-left-behind
• IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary
• IEA, Electricity 2026: https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/demand
• EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026: https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/
• Norges Bank Investment Management, H1 2026: https://www.nbim.no/en/news-and-insights/the-press/press-releases/2026/record-high-krone-return-in-the-first-half-of-the-year/
• PIF, Annual Report 2025 release: https://annualreport.pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/press-releases/2026/pif-delivers-strong-revenue-and-profit-growth-in-2025/

QA revision note: on July 30, 2026 the WGC published new analysis reducing its estimate of central-bank demand in Q1 2026 from 244 tonnes to 57 tonnes; 187 tonnes were reclassified into OTC and other demand. This revision supersedes the magnitude used in the initial version of this edition and recalibrates the associated conclusions.

Cutoff date: September 15, 2026. Data with frequencies lower than weekly remain identified by their respective reference periods.